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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 _______________ 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 The United States brought this action in the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania against 
Robert Brace, individually, and Robert Brace Farms, Inc., a 
Pennsylvania corporation (collectively, "Brace" or "defendants"), 
alleging violations of the requirement in Section 404 of the 
Clean Water Act ("CWA"), 33 U.S.C. § 1344, that a permit be 
obtained for the discharge of dredged or fill material into 
waters of the United States.  The United States sought 
restoration of the site, a permanent injunction and civil 
penalties pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d). 
 
 
 The district court bifurcated the action: a trial on 
liability issues and a trial on remedy issues.  Shortly before 
the liability trial, Brace stipulated that at the time of the 
discharges, "the approximately thirty-acre site that is the 
subject of this lawsuit was wetlands as defined at 33 C.F.R. § 
328.3(b) and 40 C.F.R. § 232.2(r)."  Pre-Trial Stipulation (Dec. 
16, 1993); Appendix ("App.") at 40. 
 The United States, either by stipulation or at trial, 
established the five elements of a prima facie case for 
violations of Section 404 of the CWA: (1) defendants admitted 
that they are "persons" within the meaning of the CWA; (2) 
defendants admitted that the activities at the site were 
conducted without a permit; (3) defendants stipulated that the 
site was a wetland at the time of the discharges; (4) the 
district court held that the site constituted waters of the 
United States at the time of defendants' activities; and (5) the 
district court held that defendant's clearing, mulching, 
churning, and levelling of the formerly wooded and vegetated site 
constituted a discharge of pollutants into the waters of the 
United States and that defendants paid for excavation and 
installation of drainage tubing in an effort to drain the site. 
 Brace asserted, and the district court held, that the 
discharges were exempt from the permit requirement under Section 
404(f)(1).  The court concluded that: (1) Brace's activities on 
the wetland constituted "normal farming activities" exempt under 
Section 404(f)(1)(A); and (2) Brace's activities constituted 
"upland soil and water conservation practices" also exempt under 
 
 
that same provision of the CWA.  United States v. Brace, C.A. No. 
90-229 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 16, 1993), slip op. at 22-23.  In addition, 
the court found that Brace's conduct in "preserving and regularly 
cleaning the existing drainage system on the site" was exempt 
from the permit requirement as "maintenance of the drainage 
system" under Section 404(f)(1)(C).  Id. at 23.  The court also 
held that the recapture provision of Section 404(f)(2) does not 
apply to this case because "[t]he land is not being converted to 
a use to which it was not previously subject, nor has significant 
impairment to the reach or flow of waters been proven."  Id. at 
22. 
 The district court entered judgment in defendants' favor.  
We hold that the district court incorrectly applied the 
requirements of the CWA permit exemption provisions.  We will 
reverse the order of the district court and remand the case to 




 Brace is a farmer who owns approximately 600 acres of real 
property in Erie County, Pennsylvania, including the subject 
thirty-acre wetland site ("the site").  Brace Farms, Inc. is a 
Pennsylvania corporation engaged principally in the farming 
business.  Brace's parents and other family members have always 
earned their principal livelihood from farming activities.  Brace 
purchased a parcel of farm property from his father in 1975.  A 
portion of that property contains the site.  The property has 
 
 
been in the Brace family since the 1930's when Brace's 
grandfather farmed the land.  Prior to 1975, Brace's father used 
the site for pasturing of cows and horses, and Brace's brother 
used the site for pasturing cows until 1976. 
 Brace purchased the property from his father with the intent 
of continuing and improving his father's established farming 
operation.  It was Brace's intention to integrate the various 
portions of the property into an overall operation for an 
effective and productive farming business.  At the time Brace 
purchased the property containing the site from his father, the 
site was vegetated with areas of scrub brush, including red brush 
and briars.   
 In 1977, Brace sought the advice and assistance of the 
Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service ("ASCS") as 
part of his plan to develop an integrated farming operation on 
the property that includes the site.  The ASCS is "an agency of 
the United States Department of Agriculture which is generally 
responsible for administering commodity production adjustment and 
certain conservation programs of the Department."  7 C.F.R. § 
12.2(a)(2) (1994).  Brace's father had previously worked with the 
ASCS to prepare a drainage plan relating to the site for the 
purpose of farming the entire property.  At the time he purchased 
the property from his father, Brace obtained and utilized the 
soil and conservation plans that had been prepared for his father 
by the ASCS.  The drainage system impacts the ability to produce 
crops on all parts of Brace's property. 
 
 
 The existing drainage system was in poor condition and not 
yet complete at the time of Brace's acquisition.  Brace began 
cleaning the system in 1976 in order to improve upon the existing 
system and make it effective for agricultural development.  In 
the following years, Brace maintained and improved the drainage 
system pursuant to the plan recommended by the ASCS.  From 1977 
to 1985 the ASCS periodically visited the site and provided 
technical assistance and cost-sharing arrangements to Brace.   
 As of 1977, the essential portions of Brace's improvements 
to the existing drainage system were intact and operating.  
Brace's work in improving upon the interconnected drainage system 
progressed continuously from 1977 to 1987, as time, funds and 
equipment were available.  If the necessary funds had been 
available to him in 1977, Brace would have expedited his farming 
plans and completed the project at that time.  As a result of 
Brace's efforts, by the end of 1979 the site was dry, with the 
exception of times of excessive rainfall.   
 Brace cleared, mulched, churned, levelled, and drained the 
formerly wooded and vegetated site from 1985 through 1987.  In 
1986 and 1987, Brace paid for excavation in the site and the 
burying of plastic tubing or "drainage tile" in an effort to 
drain the site.  Throughout the 1980's, Brace used appropriate 
equipment to remove unconsolidated soil, pebbles, silt, and 
growth which were impeding water flow.  Farmers in the area 
typically engaged in such practices. 
 As a result of Brace's levelling, spreading, and tiling, 
Brace began to grow crops on the site in 1986 and 1987.  Brace 
 
 
did not have a permit issued pursuant to Section 404 of the CWA 
authorizing his activities. 
 The United States became aware of Brace's activities in 
1987.  During 1987 and 1988, the United States issued three 
orders to Brace, directing him, inter alia, to refrain from 
further disturbing the site, so that it could naturally 
revegetate with indigenous plant species.  After the issuance of 
these orders, Brace continued to mow vegetation on the site.  In 
October of 1988, Brace received an administrative complaint in 
connection with his farming activities on the site.  Brace 
requested a hearing to contest the complaint, believing that his 
activities were exempt from any and all permit requirements.  
Prior to the hearing, the complaint was dismissed. 
 In the summer of 1988, Brace approached the ASCS in order to 
gain the status of "commenced conversion from wetlands" prior to 
December 23, 1985 with respect to the site.  The ASCS was 
authorized to make such a determination under the Food Security 
Act of 1985, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3801, et seq.  This Act contains a 
provision, referred to as the "Swampbuster," which denies certain 
Department of Agriculture benefits to farmers who produce an 
"agricultural commodity on converted wetland," unless such 
conversion commenced before December 23, 1985.  16 U.S.C. §§ 
3821, 3822 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).     
 The ASCS granted the status to the site, finding that 
Brace's on-going farming activities had commenced prior to 
December of 1985, which would enable Brace to complete conversion 
and produce an agricultural commodity without losing USDA 
 
 
benefits.  Letter from Erie County ASCS Office to Robert Brace 
(9/21/88); App. at 172.  However, the ASCS expressly noted that 
"[t]he granting of a commencement . . . request does not remove 
other legal requirements that may be required under State or 
Federal water laws."  USDA Form; App. at 173. 
 In April 1990, as a cautionary measure, Brace approached the 
Army Corps of Engineers ("COE") in an effort to obtain an after-
the-fact permit to conduct his farming activities on the site, 
despite his belief that the activities were exempt from the 
permit requirements of the CWA.  The United States Environmental 
Protection Agency ("EPA") requested that the COE not review an 
application from Brace for an after-the-fact permit.  Brace was 
advised that because the matter was then in litigation, the 
government would not act on his request for a permit.  Since the 
time of the cease and desist orders Brace has terminated farming 




 The district court exercised its jurisdiction pursuant to 33 
U.S.C. § 1319(b) (1988) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1345, 1355 (1988 & 
Supp. V 1993).  Our jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1291 
(1988). 
 Presently, there are three issues before us.  The first 
issue is whether the district court erred in determining that 
Brace's discharges of dredged and fill material into the wetland 
were exempt from the permit requirement pursuant to Section 
 
 
404(f)(1) of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(1).  The second issue 
is whether the district court erred in determining that Brace's 
discharges were not "recaptured" by the permit requirement under 
Section 404(f)(2) of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(2).  We have 
plenary review over the question of whether the district court 
erroneously interpreted the meaning of the applicable statutes.  
Moody v. Sec. Pac. Business Credit, Inc., 971 F.2d 1056, 1063 (3d 
Cir. 1992);  Manor Care, Inc. v. Yaskin, 950 F.2d 122, 124 (3d 
Cir. 1991).  To the extent that the court's ruling on these 
issues was also premised on findings of fact, we review any such 
findings under the clearly erroneous standard.  Zenith Radio 
Corp. v. Hazeltime Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 108, 89 S. Ct. 
1562, 1568 (1969); Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n Local 19 v. 
2300 Group, Inc., 949 F.2d 1274, 1278 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 The third issue is whether the district court erred in 
determining that Brace was not subject to liability for 
violations of administrative orders.  Our review of questions of 
law such as this is plenary.  Moody, 971 F.2d at 1063; Manor 




 The Clean Water Act was enacted to "restore and maintain the 
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's 
waters."  33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1988).  Section 301(a) of the CWA 
prohibits the discharge of any pollutant into navigable waters of 
the United States, unless the discharge is authorized by a 
 
 
permit.  33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1362(12) (1988).  We recognize 
that: 
 The Act defines the operative terms of this prohibition 
broadly.  The term "pollutants" includes fill material 
such as "dredged spoil, . . . rock, sand, [and] cellar 
dirt," 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6), and "navigable waters" 
means "the waters of the United States,"  id. § 
1362(7).  In so defining the term "navigable waters," 
Congress expressed a clear intent "to repudiate limits 
that had been placed on federal regulations by earlier 
water pollution control statutes and to exercise its 
powers under the Commerce Clause to regulate at least 
some waters that would not be deemed `navigable' under 
the classical understanding of the term."  
 
United States v. Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 719, 724 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. 
denied,    U.S.   , 114 S. Ct. 1052 (1994) (citations omitted).  
The district court found that Brace's clearing, churning, 
mulching, levelling, grading, and landclearing of the formerly 
wooded and vegetated site was a discharge of a dredged spoil, 
biological material, rock and/or sand, each of which fits the 
definition of pollutant.  Brace, slip op. at 18. 
 Section 404 of the CWA authorizes the Secretary of the Army, 
through the COE, to issue permits "for the discharge of dredged 
or fill material into the navigable waters at specified disposal 
sites."  33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1988).  See also 33 C.F.R. § 323.1 
(1993).  The permit program, as we recognized in Pozsgai, "is the 
central enforcement tool of the Clean Water Act . . . .  
Unpermitted discharge is the archetypical Clean Water Act 
violation, and subjects the discharger to strict liability."  999 
F.2d at 724-25. 
 
 
 The COE and EPA have issued regulations defining the term 
"waters of the United States" to include "wetlands," among other 
bodies of water:  
 (a)  The term waters of the United States means 
 
 (1)  All waters which are currently used, or were used 
in the past, or may be susceptible to use in interstate 
or foreign commerce, including all waters which are 
subject to the ebb and flow of the tide; . . .  
  
 (3)  All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, 
streams (including intermittent streams), . . . 
wetlands, . . . the use, degradation or destruction of 
which could effect interstate or foreign commerce . . . 
 
 (5)  Tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs 
(a)(1) through (4) of this section . . .  
 
 (7)  Wetlands adjacent to waters (other than waters 
that are themselves wetlands) identified in paragraphs 
(a)(1) through (6) of this section. 
 
33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (1993); 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s) (1993) 
(emphasis in original).  The district court found that the site 
constituted waters of the United States at the time of Brace's 
activities.  Brace, slip op. at 17.  The term "wetlands" is 
defined as: 
 those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface 
or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient 
to support, and that under normal circumstances do 
support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted 
for life in saturated soil conditions.  Wetlands 
generally include swamps, marshes, bogs, and similar 
areas. 
33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b); 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(t).  The parties have 




 Exemptions to the general requirement for a Section 404 
permit are contained in Section 404(f) of the CWA.  Under Section 
404(f)(1), a permit is not required for: (1) the discharge of 
dredged or fill material "from normal farming, silviculture, and 
ranching activities such a plowing, seeding, cultivating, minor 
drainage, harvesting for the production of food, fiber, and 
forest products, or upland soil and water conservation 
practices," 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(1)(A); and (2) the discharge of 
dredged or fill material "for the purpose of . . . the 
maintenance of drainage ditches."  33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(1)(C). 
 The COE and EPA have promulgated regulations which provide 
that the "normal farming activities" exemption is available only 
to discharge activities that are "part of an established (i.e., 
on-going) farming . . . operation," and expressly stipulate that 
the exemption is not available either: (1) for "[a]ctivities 
which bring an area into farming . . . use"; or (2) where 
"modifications to the hydrological regime are necessary to resume 
operations."  33 C.F.R. § 323.4(a)(1)(ii) (1993); 40 C.F.R. § 
232.3(c)(1)(ii)(A), (B) (1993).   
 This provision further requires that, to be exempt from the 
permit requirement, such activities "must be in accordance with 
definitions in 33 C.F.R. § 323.4(a)(1)(iii)."  33 C.F.R. § 
323.4(a)(1)(ii).  The definitions in 33 C.F.R. § 323.4(a)(1)(iii) 
provide that "the redistribution of surface materials by blading, 
grading, or other means to fill in wetland areas is not plowing."  
33 C.F.R. § 323.4(a)(1)(iii)(D); 40 C.F.R. § 232.3(d)(4).  The 
definitions also define "minor drainage" as meaning "[t]he 
 
 
discharge of dredged or fill material incidental to connecting 
upland drainage facilities to waters of the United States, 
adequate to effect the removal of excess soil moisture from 
upland croplands."  33 C.F.R. § 323.4(a)(1)(C)(1)(i); 40 C.F.R. § 
232.3(d)(3)(i)(A).  This latter definition is modified by 33 
C.F.R. § 323.4(a)(1)(iii)(C)(2) and 40 C.F.R. § 232.3(d)(3)(ii), 
which further provide that the term minor drainage "does not 
include drainage associated with the immediate or gradual 
conversion of a wetland to a non-wetland . . . , or conversion 
from one wetland use to another."   
 The COE has also promulgated definitions concerning the 
second exemption to the permit requirement, i.e. the exemption 
for the maintenance of drainage ditches.  The definitions provide 
that the exemption from the permit requirement applies to 
"maintenance (but not construction) of drainage ditches."  33 
C.F.R. § 323.4(a)(3). 
 Even where Section 404(f)(1) exempts a discharge from the 
permit requirement, the discharge may be "recaptured" by the 
permit requirement under Section 404(f)(2): 
 Any discharge of dredged or fill material into the 
navigable waters incidental to any activity having as 
its purpose bringing an area of the navigable waters 
into a use to which it was not previously subject, 
where the flow or circulation of navigable waters may 
be impaired or the reach of such waters be reduced, 
shall be required to have a permit under this section. 
 
33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(2).  The regulation governing the "recapture" 
provision stipulates in part that "[a] conversion of a section 
404 wetland to a non-wetland is a change in use of an area of 
 
 
waters of the United States,"  33 C.F.R. § 323.4(c), and states 
as an example, that "a permit will be required for the conversion 
of a cypress swamp to some other use . . . when there is a 
discharge of dredged or fill material into waters of the United 
Stated in conjunction with construction of . . . structures used 
to effect such conversion."  Id. 
 Thus, to be exempt from the CWA permit requirement, a 
defendant has the burden of demonstrating that proposed 
activities both satisfy the requirements of Section 404(f)(1) and 
avoid the recapture provision of Section 404(f)(2).  United 
States v. Akers, 785 F.2d 814, 819 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 
U.S. 828, 107 S. Ct. 107 (1986).  See also United States v. 
Cumberland Farms, 647 F. Supp. 1166, 1176 (D. Mass. 1986) 
("[E]ven if [defendant] could establish that it is exempt from 
the permit requirements under § 1344(f)(1), it must also 
demonstrate that its activities avoid `recapture' under the 
provisions of 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(2)."), aff'd, 826 F.2d 1151 
(1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1061, 108 S. Ct. 1016 
(1988).  Read together, the two parts of Section 404(f) provide a 
narrow exemption for agricultural activities that have little or 
no adverse effect on the waters of the United States.  Avoyelles 
Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 926 (5th Cir. 
1983).  Congress intended this narrow exemption.  As Senator 
Muskie, one of the primary sponsors of the CWA, explained: 
 New subsection 404(f) provides that Federal permits 
will not be required for those narrowly defined 
activities that cause little or no adverse effects 
either individually or cumulatively.  While it is 
understood that some of these activities may 
 
 
necessarily result in incidental filling and minor harm 
to aquatic resources, the exemptions do not apply to 
discharges that convert extensive areas of water into 
dry land or impede circulation or reduce the reach or 
size of the water body. 
 
3 A Legislative History of the Clean Water Act of 1977:  A 
Continuation of the Legislative History of the Water Pollution 




 The district court held that Brace's activities on the 
thirty-acre wetland site were exempt from Section 404's permit 
requirement "because they constitute: (a) normal farming 
activities; (b) upland soil and water conservation practices; and 
(c) maintenance of drainage ditches."  Brace, slip op. at 22.  We 
find that the district court's determination is erroneous as a 
matter of law.  
 The district court's conclusion that Brace's discharges on 
the thirty-acre site constituted "normal farming activities" 
which are exempt from Section 404's permit requirement cannot be 
reconciled with the statute, the applicable regulations, and case 
law governing the "normal farming activities" exemption.   As we 
described above, Section 404(f) of the CWA provides exemptions to 
the general permit requirement, including the discharge of 
dredged or fill material without a permit in connection with 
"normal farming . . . activities such as plowing, seeding, 
cultivating, minor drainage, harvesting . . . or upland soil and 
 
 
water conservation practices."  33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(1)(A).  In 
determining that Brace's activities fell within this provision, 
the district court relied on facts that are irrelevant to the 
inquiry required by the applicable law.  The district court 
appears to have based its conclusion on a casual observation that 
what Brace did was "normal" activity for a farmer in Erie County, 
rather than on the application of the regulatory construction 
accorded the statutory term "normal farming activities" by the 
agencies charged with the implementation of the statute.1 
 The applicable regulation provides that, to constitute 
"normal farming activity" within the meaning of the statute, the 
activity: 
 must be part of an established (i.e., on-going) farming 
. . . operation and must be in accordance with the 
definitions in § 323.4(a)(1)(iii) . . . .  Activities 
which bring an area into farming . . . use are not part 
of an established operation.  An operation ceases to be 
established when the area on which it was conducted has 
been converted to another use or has lain idle so long 
that modifications to the hydrological regime are 
necessary to resume operations. 
 
33 C.F.R. § 323.4(a)(1)(ii).  Brace's activities between 1985 and 
1987 meet neither prong of this provision:  they were neither 
part of an "established (i.e., on-going) farming operation," nor 




                     
1.  See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(d) and 1344 for the implementation 




 Brace points out that in determining whether farming 
activities are established and continuing, the conduct must be 
analyzed by a contextual review of the total activities.  
Cumberland Farms, 647 F. Supp. at 1175.  He argues that the 
district court correctly undertook a contextual analysis in its 
determination that the site was an integral part of an 
established and on-going farm operation, and Brace's activities 
between 1985 and 1987 did not bring a new area into the 
operation.  Brace, slip op. at 12.  The district court based its 
conclusion on: (1) its determination that the site is an integral 
part of the drainage system previously installed in adjoining 
crop producing fields; (2) its finding that the installation of a 
drainage system at the site "is normal farming activity in order 
to make land suitable for farming," because "[e]xtensive 
underground drainage systems are typical and necessary aspects of 
farming in Erie County," id. at 3; and (3) the ASCS determination 
that Brace had "commenced conversion" of the site from wetland to 
cropland prior to December 23, 1985.  
 The district court's reasoning and conclusion are improper.  
The district court misinterpreted the meaning of the "established 
farming operation" requirement.  The district court believed it 
was appropriate to examine the relationship of the site in 
question to the rest of the land owned by the same property-owner 
in determining whether land was being brought into farming use.  
Brace maintains that it is arbitrary to delineate artificially a 
portion of the farm and without rational justification sever it 
 
 
from his overall operations.  We cannot agree with this 
interpretation of the statute's requirement.   
 The regulations provide that, "[a]ctivities which bring an 
area into farming . . . use are not part of an established 
operation."  33 C.F.R. § 323.4(a)(1)(ii); 40 C.F.R. § 
232.3(c)(1)(ii)(B) (emphasis added).  The regulations do not 
specify the precise area to which we should look in determining 
whether there is an established farming operation.  There are no 
minimum limits placed on the "area" being brought into farming 
use.  Thus, we read the regulations to provide that an exemption 
is available only to activities that are part of an "established 
farming operation" at the site.  A proper "contextual review of 
its total activities" only requires us to analyze whether such 
activities are "established and continuing" on the thirty-acre 
wetland site itself.  See Cumberland Farms, 647 F. Supp. at 1175 
(referring to "the site," rather than the property owner's total 
land holdings).2  Our reading of the regulation recognizes the 
statute's legislative history and is in accord with the strict 
construction of the permit exemptions afforded by other Courts of 
Appeals.  See, e.g., Akers, 785 F.2d at 819, 823; United States 
v. Huebner, 752 F.2d 1235, 1240-41 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 
U.S. 817, 106 S. Ct. 62 (1985); Marsh, 715 F.2d at 925 n.44.  
                     
2.  We recognize that the designation of the use of some very 
small sites will be effectively inseparable from the use of the 
surrounding land for established farming operations.  Thus, we 
would not require that every square foot be used for farming in 
order for a site to meet the established operation exemption.  In 
this case, however, it is clearly reasonable to require that all 




 Brace himself testified that: (1) for the nine-year period 
prior to the discharges onto the site, from 1977 to 1986, his 
activities at the site included no pasturing or growing of any 
crops, but consisted entirely of efforts to drain the wetland; 
(2) the site was fully covered in 1983 with indigenous plants, 
but that all plants had been stripped from the site in 1987, 
subsequent to the discharge activities; and (3) the purpose of 
his 1985-1987 discharges was to drain the wetland and make it 
suitable for row cropping.  The district court found that "[a]s a 
result of Defendants' levelling, spreading and tiling, Defendants 
began to grow crops on the site in 1986 and 1987."  Brace, slip 
op. at 9 (emphasis added).  These facts do not justify the 
district court's determination that Brace's activities on the 
site were exempt from the permit requirements as "normal farming 
activities."  Indeed, the factual findings of the district court 
can only lead to the opposite conclusion.  Brace converted a 
thirty-acre site that was not suitable for farming into a site 
that is suitable for farming, and thus "brought an area into 
farming use." 
 Even if Brace's father's pre-1975 use of the site for 
pasturing could be considered to have been a prior, "established 
farming operation" on the site, Brace's drainage activities 
demonstrate that the court erred as a matter of law in finding 
the exemption from the permit requirement available for his 
subsequent activities.  Under the regulations, a farming 
operation is not "ongoing" where "modifications to the 
hydrological regime are necessary to resume operations."  33 
 
 
C.F.R. § 323.4(a)(1)(ii); 40 C.F.R. § 232.3(c)(1)(ii)(B).  Here, 
Brace admitted that "modifications to the hydrological regime," 
i.e., drainage of the site through excavating and burying four 
miles of plastic tubing for drainage, were necessary to grow 
crops on the site. 
 Our determination is consistent with the holdings of 
numerous other courts that have found the "normal farming" 
exemption inapplicable because modifications were required to 
resume farming.  See, e.g., Akers, 785 F.2d at 819-20 
("[Defendant] argued below that unless he were allowed to 
complete the work he had started, the effect of which is to drain 
the wetland, he would be unable to engage in the farming 
activities he had planned.  By his own admission, his activities 
require substantial hydrological alteration to [the site], and 
run afoul of the regulations.");  Bayou Marcus Livestock & Agric. 
Co. v. EPA, No. 88-30275, 20 Envtl. L. Rev. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 
20445, 20446 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 3, 1989) ("Before plaintiffs could 
have effectively harvested the timber and begun farming, it was 
necessary to dredge, fill, construct roads and dig ditches . . . 
.  [I]f an ongoing operation had been previously functioning, 
such changes in the landscape would have been unnecessary.");  
United States v. Larkins, 657 F. Supp. 76, 85-86 n.23 (W.D. Ky. 
1987) ("Activities cease to be established when the property on 
which they were once conducted `. . . has lain idle so long that 
modifications to the hydrological regime are necessary to resume 
operations.'  Reducing the reach of the [site] required 
modifications of the site's hydrological regime.  Consequently, 
 
 
even if the wetland had a history of farm use, that use was no 
longer established at the time [of defendant's activities]." 
(emphasis by court) (citations omitted)), aff'd, 852 F.2d 189 
(6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1016, 109 S. Ct. 1131 
(1989). 
 Brace suggests that this line of cases is distinguishable 
from his circumstances because of, inter alia, the larger size of 
the farms and wetlands at issue in those cases, and the fact that 
one site was a habitat for an endangered species.  We cannot 
agree.  There is no provision in Section 404(f)(1) of the CWA or 
its implementing regulations under which either the size of a 
wetland or the effect of discharge activities on wildlife are 
factors relevant to determining whether particular discharge 
activities are exempt from the permit requirement.  Although 
wetland protection in Section 404 serves the important function 
of protecting wildlife habitats, in addition to several other 
functions including flood and erosion control and water 
purification, see 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(b)(2), neither the statute 
nor the regulations condition the permit requirement on the 
existence of adverse impacts on wildlife or on the particular 
size of a wetland.  Indeed, we have upheld determinations of both 
civil and criminal liability for the discharge of fill material 
onto a 14-acre wetland site, a substantially smaller site than 
Brace's, where there was no claim of adverse impact on wildlife.  
United States v. Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 719 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. 
denied,    U.S.   , 114 S. Ct. 1052 (1994) (civil), and United 
 
 
States v. Pozsgai, 897 F.2d 524 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 
812, 111 S. Ct. 48 (1990) (criminal). 
 In addition to the district court's erroneous interpretation 
of the "established farming operation" requirement, the district 
court erred as a matter of law in finding that Brace's 
installation of a drainage system at the site "is a normal 
farming activity in order to make land suitable for farming," 
because "[e]xtensive underground drainage systems are typical and 
necessary aspects of farming in Erie County."  Brace, slip op. at 
3.  Brace argues that the court correctly considered the area-
specific context in its fact finding inquiry.  However, this 
factual determination is a legal conclusion, and is not merely a 
matter for factual findings.  The question is not whether farmers 
in a particular county install extensive drainage systems.  
Rather, the proper question is whether the activities performed 
by Brace at this particular site, and at a time when the CWA 
applied, were within the meaning of the statutory term "normal 
farming activities" as defined by the regulations.  Regardless of 
how "typical" or "necessary" such drainage systems may be in Erie 
County, Section 404 of the CWA requires a permit for "activities 
which bring an area into farming . . . use," as opposed to 
activities that are part of an "established farming operation."  
Brace did not have an "established farming operation" on the site 
prior to his discharges, and brought the site into farming use by 
discharging pollutants into waters of the United States. 
 Moreover, the district court erred in relying upon a 
determination from the ASCS in September of 1988 that Brace had 
 
 
"commenced conversion" of his property from wetland to cropland 
prior to December 23, 1985, as evidence of an "established 
farming operation" at the site.  The USDA Swampbuster Commenced 
and Third-Party Determinations form signed by Brace expressly 
states that "[t]he granting of a commencement . . . does not 
remove other legal requirements that may be required under State 
or Federal water laws."  USDA Form; App. at 173.  The purpose of 
the "commenced conversion" determination is solely to prevent the 
loss of USDA benefits.  The ASCS determination is not a 
dispositive factor in our analysis.  
 Moreover, to the extent that the ASCS determination has any 
relevance to our analysis of "normal farming activities," it 
undermines such a conclusion.  The very title of the 
determination -- "commenced conversion" -- indicates that Brace's 
discharge activities were not part of an ongoing farming 
operation, but rather, were directed at converting the wetland to 
the farming operation of growing crops.  Even if the ASCS 
determination had stated that a conversion had been completed by 
December 23, 1985, the CWA permit requirement would not have been 
affected.  Brace's activities were unpermitted and unauthorized 
when they occurred, and the "commenced conversion" determination 







 As we explained above, the regulation governing the "normal 
farming activities" exemption has a second prong, under which 
drainage activities, in addition to being a part of an 
"established farming operation" as defined by the regulation, 
must be "in accordance with definitions in § 323.4(a)(1)(iii)."  
33 C.F.R. § 323.4(a)(1)(ii).  Brace's activities failed to meet 
the requirements of this second prong in addition to not being a 
part of an ongoing, established farming operation.  Brace's 
undisputed activities: (1) excavating soil and discharging in 
connection with burying approximately four miles of plastic 
tubing for drainage; (2) levelling and clearing the formerly 
wooded and vegetated site; and (3) spreading dredged material, 
are all excluded from the activities allowed under 33 C.F.R. § 
323.4(a)(1)(iii). 
 Brace's installation of four miles of tubing which drains 
the site is barred by the provision's express prohibition of 
both: (1) "the construction of any . . . structure which drains 
or otherwise significantly modifies . . . a wetland or aquatic 
area constituting waters of the United States"; and (2) "drainage 
associated with the immediate or gradual conversion of a wetland 
to a non-wetland . . ., or conversion from one wetland use to 
another."  33 C.F.R. § 323.4(a)(1)(iii)(C)(2).  See also 40 
C.F.R. § 232.3(d)(3)(D)(ii).  Brace's clearing of all vegetation 
from the wetland site, and his spreading of dredged materials 
onto the site, are barred by the provision's express prohibition 
of both: (1) "the redistribution of soil, rock, sand, or other 
surficial materials in a manner which changes any area of the 
 
 
waters of the United States to dryland"; and (2) "the 
redistribution of surface materials by blading, grading, or other 
means to fill in wetland areas."  33 C.F.R. § 
323.4(a)(1)(iii)(D).  See also 40 C.F.R. § 232.3(d)(4).  
Accordingly, by definition, Brace's discharge activities cannot 
constitute "normal farming activities" under the applicable 
regulation.   
 We are unpersuaded by Brace's assertion that we need not 
reach the definitions of 33 C.F.R. § 323.4(a)(1)(iii) because 
there was no conversion from one wetland use to another.  Brace 
bases his argument on the district court's determination that 
Brace simply maintained and improved his drainage system, and 
continued, piece by piece, to farm land which, in one form or 
another, had always been used for crops or pasture.  Brace 
asserts that spreading materials that he dredged from ditches on 
the site onto other portions of the site was an ordinary and 
normal maintenance procedure employed by local farmers.   Under 
the CWA, a permit is not required for the discharge of dredged or 
fill material for the purpose of maintaining drainage ditches.  
33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(1)(C).  Thus, Brace argues and the district 
court agreed that Brace's activities constituted maintenance of 
drainage ditches, an activity clearly exempt from the permit 
requirements of the CWA. 
 The exemption from the permit requirements under Section 
404(f)(1)(C) for "maintenance of drainage ditches" applies to 
"any discharge of dredged or fill material that may result from . 
. . the maintenance (but not construction) of drainage ditches."  
 
 
33 C.F.R. § 323.4(a)(3) (emphasis added).  We find the district 
court erred as a matter of law in finding that Brace was simply 
maintaining rather than constructing the drainage ditches.  
Likewise, the conclusion of the district court that the 
activities of Brace do not require a permit because they 
constitute maintenance of drainage ditches, Brace, slip op. at 
22, is not supported by the evidence.  Brace caused the 
excavation of the site and the burying of several miles of 
plastic tubing to facilitate drainage.  It is not realistic to 
describe what Brace was doing as "continuing maintenance."  
Brace's construction of a drainage system absent a permit was 
expressly prohibited by the regulation absent a permit.  See 
Huebner, 752 F.2d at 1242 (defendants' cleaning and deepening 
existing ditches, excavating a new ditch, and discharging dredged 
materials required a permit when it brought an area of navigable 
waters into a use to which it was not previously subject). 
 Moreover, any activity that could be described as 
maintenance of drainage ditches was accomplished, if at all, by 
dredging ditches at the site.  Brace's subsequent levelling at 
the site and spreading of the dredged material were separate, 
independent activities that are not subject to an exemption from 
the permit requirement.  This subsequent spreading of dredged 
materials onto other portions of the site served no purpose 
beyond converting the thirty-acre wetland site to an upland site 
that could accommodate the growing of crops; it did not "result" 
from the maintenance of drainage ditches.  There is no statutory 
or regulatory provision under which the spreading of the dredged 
 
 
materials is permissible absent a permit.  The district court 





 As we discussed above, Brace has the burden of proving both 
that he qualifies under Section 404(f)(1) for the normal farming 
activities exemption, and that the permit requirement was not 
"recaptured" under Section 404(f)(2) of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 
1344(f)(2).  The "recapture" provision stipulates that: 
 Any discharge of dredged or fill material into the 
navigable waters incidental to any activity having as 
its purpose bringing an area of the navigable waters 
into a use to which it was not previously subject, 
where the flow or circulation of navigable waters may 
be impaired or the reach of such waters be reduced, 
shall be required to have a permit under this section. 
 
33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(2).  The applicable regulation provides that 
"[a] conversion of a section 404 wetland to a non-wetland is a 
change in use of an area of the waters of the United States."  33 
C.F.R. § 323.4(c). 
 Initially, the district court incorrectly stated that the 
application of the recapture provision required the United States 
to establish the two elements: 
 First, it must be established that Brace's activities 
were conducted in order to bring the property into a 
use to which it was not previously subject.  Second, if 
this element is established, it must then be 
established that Brace's activities will impair the 
flow or circulation of navigable waters or will reduce 




Brace, slip op. at 21.  The court's articulation of the legal 
standard implies that the burden of demonstrating "recapture" is 
on the United States.  This legal standard is erroneous. 
 Since we have held that Brace's drainage activities on the 
thirty-acre wetland site are not exempt from the CWA permit 
requirement under the "normal farming activities" or maintenance 
of drainage ditches exemptions, we need not reach the application 
of the recapture provision.  We note, however, that the district 
court's conclusion that the recapture provision does not apply 
because "[t]he land is not being converted to a use to which it 
was not previously subject, nor has significant impairment to the 
reach or flow of waters been proven,"  Brace, slip op. at 22, is 
incorrect as a matter of law.  The evidence establishes that 
Brace's activities drained the site to convert it from a wetland 
to a new, non-wetland use:  the district court found that the 
site was inundated with water at various times in the past; the 
parties stipulated, and the court found, that the site 
constituted a wetland at the time of the discharges; Brace 
admitted that the purpose of installing the four miles of plastic 
tubing at the site in 1986 and 1987, and of clearing the 
vegetation from the site between 1985 and 1987, was to drain the 
site and make the ground ready for growing crops; and the court 
found that as a result of Brace's levelling, spreading and 
tiling, he began to grow crops on the site in 1986 and 1987.  
Thus, Brace's activities fall squarely within the statutory 






 The last issue that we must address is that of Brace's 
penalty for violations of the permit requirements of Section 404 
of the CWA and for his violations of the EPA administrative 
orders.  Clearly, under the CWA Section 309(d), Brace is subject 
to a civil penalty for his violation of the CWA permit 
requirements.  33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1988).3  Upon remand the 
district court must determine the appropriate amount of the 
penalty, based on the statutory factors delineated in Section 
309(d). 
 The more difficult issue is whether Brace is also subject to 
civil penalties for his noncompliance with the EPA administrative 
orders.  The district court found both that: (1) the EPA's 
administrative order had required Brace "to cease and desist all 
activities on the site," Brace, slip op. at 14; and (2) 
                     
3.  Section 1319(d) provides in pertinent part: 
 
 Any person who violates section 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 
1318, 1328, or 1345 of this title, or any permit 
condition or limitation implementing any of such 
sections in a permit issued under section . . . 1344 of 
this title by a State, . . . and any person who 
violates any order issued by the Administrator under 
subsection (a) of this section, shall be subject to a 
civil penalty not to exceed $25,000 per day for each 
violation.  In determining the amount of a civil 
penalty the court shall consider the seriousness of the 
violation or violations, the economic benefit (if any) 
resulting from the violation, any history of such 
violations, any good-faith efforts to comply with the 
applicable requirements, the economic impact of the 
penalty on the violator, and such other matters as 
justice may require. 
 
 
"Defendants failed to totally comply with Administrative Orders 
issued to them."  Brace, slip op. at 14.  However, the district 
court did not attach liability for violating the orders, based on 
its findings that "Defendants have not disturbed the soil on the 
site in any significant way since being served with the cease and 
desist orders, and in the view of this Court acted only out of 
sincere conviction, although undoubtedly misguided."  Id. 
 Section 309(d) provides that "any person who violates any 
order issued by the Administrator under subsection (a) of this 
section, shall be subject to a civil penalty."  33 U.S.C. § 
1319(d).  Section 309(d) does not afford the district court 
discretion to grant an exemption from liability for violating the 
EPA administrative orders.  See, e.g., Atlantic States Legal 
Foundation v. Tyson Foods, 897 F.2d 1128, 1142 (11th Cir. 1990) 
(the language of Section 309(d) "makes clear that once a 
violation has been established, some form of penalty is 
required.")  However, the record is not sufficiently clear for us 
to determine whether civil penalties are mandatory under the 
circumstances of this case.  We remand this issue to the district 
court for further review of Brace's non-compliance with the EPA 
administrative orders.  Thereafter, the district court must 
determine what, if any, civil penalties should be assessed 
against Brace for his violations of the EPA administrative 
orders.  
 




 For the foregoing reasons, the order entered December 17, 
1993, granting judgment in favor of the defendants, Robert Brace 
and Robert Brace Farms, Inc., will be reversed.  This matter will 
be remanded to the district court to enter judgment in favor of 
the United States and to assess upon further proceedings 
appropriate penalties for defendants' violations of the permit 
requirements, and to assess what, if any, penalties are 
appropriate for violations of the EPA administrative orders. 
